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The Labour Relations Act and global 
competitiveness 
SIR BOB HEPPlE QC 
The South African I"abour Kelations Act (I"KA) was an essential part of the 
process of political democratisation. Together with the Bill of Kights', the 
Basic Conditions of Employment Act' and the Employment Equity Act', it 
entrenched many of the basic labour rights which South African trade 
unions had demanded for over 70 years. It was a high water mark in the 
tide of social regulation of market relations, one that both astounded and 
inspired unions in other parts of the world who have been feeling the cold 
winds of economic IiberalisaLion since the 19805. 
Yet at the very moment that democratisation enabled South Africa to 
rejoin the global economy, those cold winds began to blow fiercely 
through industry. The Government signalled the end of protectionism and 
tariff barriers; this has been accompanied by financial liberalisation and 
tough Fiscal policies, privatisation, and the introduction of labour market 
'flexibility' involving increased casualisation, outsourCing, and the intensi-
fication of work. Webster and Adler" described this process of political 
democratisation under conditions of economic liberalisation as 'double 
transition', 
Economic hberalisation has been accompanied by claims that the 
labour market is rigid as a result of the bargaining council system and 
other regulation, and demands that this regulation should be scaled-down 
so as LO allow markets to delermine wage Jevels,t> 
The orthodox view is that globalisation is undermining the ability of 
nation states to regulate their own employment relations. In this scenario 
transnational corporations afe able t.o put pressure on governments and 
unions to reduce labour costs by threatening to relocate. Trade unions and 
civil society are too weak to resist. International solidarity action between 
workers in different countries is frequently unlawful and, in any event, is 
usually impossible to organise because one worker's redundancy in country 
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A. may be another worker's gain in country B. In theory. the increased 
demand for labour in low~cos( countries will induce workers (0 migrate to 
fill these jobs and this. in turn. will lead to higher wages and benefits in 
those countries. In practice most workers do not migrate for a number of 
reasons, such as political opposition to and legal restrictions on immi-
gration. Even when they are able to cross borders. they are generally 
unwilling to do so for reasons of family. language. culture. and cost. The 
combination of these factors leads those who argue for the orthodox view 
to say that deregulation or a severe weakening of labour rights is the 
necessary and inevitable consequence of modern globalisation. A cause-
and-effect relationship is assumed between globalisation and the alleged 
shrinkage of the coverage of labour rights. the growth of more insecure. 
irregular. non-un ionised forms of employment. and the decline of collec-
tive representation and collective bargaining. This means that there is a 
'race to the bottom'. the memorable phrase used by Mr Justice Brandeis 
in 1933 to describe the competition between states to reduce regulatory 
requirements so as to attract business. l 
In this article I am going to advance a different view." I shall argue that 
nations prosper in the global economy not by becoming more similar in 
their labour laws but by building their institutional advantages on a floor 
of fundamental human rights I hope to show that rights-based regulation 
is worth developing in order to give South Africa a comparative advantage 
in global trade and investment. 
The orthodox view of the effects of globalisatlon on labour laws. is de-
fective for three main reasons. First. j[ over-emphasises the role of labour 
costs in decisions about relocating or outsourcing. Firms are not likcly to 
move to another statc with lower nominal labour costS if those costs sim-
ply reflect lower productivity of the workers in that state. Let us suppose 
(hac a worker in a British call centre is paid RIOO per hour and, on aver-
age answers ten calls in that time. If the worker in a call centre in South 
Africa is paid R50 per hour. but answers only five calls in that time. there 
would be no net difference in labour costs. If labour costs do not reflect 
the relative productivity in a particular state, and a firm relocates to that 
state, the result would be to increase demand for labour. with the likeli-
hood of rising wage levels. This WOUld. in due course. cancel out the 
advantages of relocation which was based purely on low labour costs. 
Moreover, in calculating costs one has to take account not only of relative 
wages, but also the costS of training the new labour force to ensure that 
they have the language and other skills and local knowledge required. The 
preferences of customers for a particular kind of service will influence 
relocation decisions. Not surprisingly, a UN Conference on Trade and 
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Development Report concluded that 'despite a few notable cases, trans-
national corporations do not often close down on account of low labour 
coSt considerations alone, production facilities in one country to re~estab~ 
!ish them in another country'.~ 
The second objection to the orthodox theory is that it neglects the pos-
itive gains from free trade which can offset job losses. What this means is 
that while some jobs are lost due to globalisation, others will be gained 
provided that they are relatively more productive than in other countries. 
Workers who lose their jobs may take some time to retrain or to relocate. 
They need to be informed. to be consulted about the best ways to miti-
gate these short~term disturbances, and to receive financial assistance. 
This is precisely why displaced workers need rights to information, con-
sultation, redundancy payments and the protection of acquired rights, as 
well as mechanisms to help them shift to new jobs. In this the procedures 
for collective bargaining and workplace forums give South Africa a real 
comparative advantage. 
The third objection to the orthodox view is that it assumes that the 
strategies and structures of all firms are similar across states. In their influ~ 
entia I work on Varieties of Capitalism, lIall and Soskice argue that firms 
react differently to similar challenges. Ie Their analysis indicates that firms 
do not automatically move their activities off~shore when offered low 
labour costs abroad. These scholars put forward the notion that firms may 
concentrate their activities in countries that provide the advantages of the 
institutional or regulatory frameworks that those countries offer. Firms 
that need to develop a new product qUickly so as to get a market advan-
tage - for example in biotechnology or telecommunications - want to be 
able to hire and fire workers rapidly, use temporary and agency labour, 
and not have to inform and consult, or bargain with, workers' representa~ 
lives. On the other hand, firms that place a premium on continuity of pro-
duction and long-range development need consensus rather than adver~ 
sarial decision-making. They have a greater incentive to provide job secur-
ity and in-house training as well as forms of worker involvement. Accord~ 
ingly, they will tend to concentrate in countries where there is institutional 
support for these rights. This has been the case in sectors such as me~ 
chanical engineering, product handling, consumer durables and machine 
tools. Let me take a small example from Europe. It is quicker and cheaper 
to dismiss a worker in Britain than in Germany. In Britain there is no need 
to consult workers' representatives except (as a result of EU law) in the 
case of collective redundancies or transfers of undertakings, the employ-
ment tribunals allow em players freedom to dismiss so long as they act 
within a range of reasonable responses and observe fair procedures, aver-
age amounts of compensation are low, and reinstatement is a rarity. In 
Germany, on the other hand, the works council must be consulted before 
9 LIN Conh!rencc on Tril(k illld DcveiopnWrll. WIJrld lnvrstmrnt Fi.epIJrt 1994: Trans· 
national Corporations. employment and the Workplace (United Narions, New York, [lJlJ4) 
10 Hall and Soskin' Varieties (!f Cllpiw(ism: [hI:' inslillltional foundations qf comparative 
advllntage ()xl·ord University Press. Oxtord. 20D]) 
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every dismissal and failure to do so renders the dismissal null and void. 
The works council is in a better position than the employee (0 control the 
social aspects of the dismissal. From the employer's point of view, the col~ 
laboration with the works council ensures a long~term relationship of trust 
and confidence." Firms that want high labour turnover may prefer UK dis-
missal law; those that place a premium on collaboration and stability may 
favour Germany - in reality. of course. dismissal laws are only one of the 
factors taken into account in relocation decisions. 
This theory of comparative institutional advantage helps to explain why 
- contrary to many predictions - globalisation has not in fact led to 
across-the-board deregulation of labour laws, or the disappearance of 
standard forms of contract. A universal cause~and~effect relationship 
between globalisation and deregulation has not been established. One of 
the paradoxes of globalisation is that 'nations often prosper not by be-
coming more similar, but by building on their institutional differences'. I" 
This leads me to ask: can the model of rights-based employment regu-
lation which has developed in South Africa since 1994 be justified on 
grounds of comparative advantage? Those - particularly public choice 
theorists - who give priority to the economic functions of labour laws tend 
(0 argue that economic globalisation is leading to 'law without the state' 
because the state is a fetter on the free play of global market forces." If 
that is correct, rights granted by the state are the natural enemy of com-
petitiveness. However, all but the most extreme Free market economists, 
would agree that rights may sometimes be necessary to correct market 
failures. Markets may generate differences in wages and working condi-
tions that have no relationship to the value added by indiVidual workers. 
The labour of some is over-valued while that of others is under-valued. 
Under~valued labour is inefficient, hampers innovation and leads to de~ 
structive competition. It was thiS argument that was used by the French to 
claim during the negotiations for the 1957 Treaty of Rome that they 
would be at a competitive disadvantage if they were the only country 
among the six with a law requiring equal pay for women and men. This 
was endorsed by an ILO Committee of Experts (the Ohlin Committee) 
which said that 'countries in which there are large differentials of sex will 
pay relatively low wages to industries employing a large proportion of 
female labour and those countries will enjoy what might be considered as 
a special advantage over their competitors abroad where differentials 
according to sex are smaller or non-existent'. 14 The result was Article 119 
(now 141) of the EC Treaty laying down the prinCiple of equal pay - not, 
---,,---
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at the time, as a fundamental human right, but as an economic necessity 
to ensure fair competition. 
Another economic justification for employment rights is that they can 
improve efficiency. One example is the right to a minimum wage. Pro-
vided this is set at a sensible level, it encourages employers to invest in 
technology and in the skilled workforce that technology requires. Another 
pair of examples is equality rights. and rights to parental leave and child-
care. The former enable disadvantaged groups to enter and remain in the 
labour market and improve their skills. The latter make it easier for 
women and men to reconcile family and working life, and so remain in 
the labour market. 
There are also social justifications for a rights-based approach. One of 
these is to counteract the inequality of the employment relationship. The 
social-democratic model of rights first developed in Weimar Germany 
(1919-1933). and widely followed 10 most Continental countries after the 
Second World War. was based on the notion that rights are needed by 
subordinate or dependent labour so as to maintain a balanced system of 
industrial pluralism. This was done in Germany by giving constitutional 
protection to workers' rights and enabling the works councils to act as 
custodians of individual protection. However, not all democratic societies 
answered the problem of inequality in the employment relationship by 
the creation of rights. In Britain until the 1970s, 'Labourism' rather than 
any ideology of legal tights was the dominant influence. The British ap-
proach was to defend social and organisational rights won through indus-
trial struggle. using the law on a pragmatic basis only when voluntary 
means were inadequate. The decline of trade union strength and collect· 
ive bargaining since the 1980s have greatly enhanced the importance of 
both statutory and common law rights as a means of redressing inequal-
ity. Even from a liberal, as distinct from a social democratic perspective, it 
is possible to argue -as Ronald Dworkin has - that the right of everyone 
to equal treatment and respect is not antithetical to liberty of contract, 
which is still the cornerstone of employment law. 15 
Perhaps the most persuasive argument for rights is that they can be 
used to support democratic control over the process and effects of global-
isation. Democratic S[3tes generally recognise or tolerate the autonomy of 
a plurality of legal orders. This is particularly relevant in the labour field. 
where 'law' is not necessarily coterminous with the state. A variety of 
actors make rules, enforced through non-State mechanisms or customs, 
within the workshop or office, enterprise or industry, and these rules may 
be even more important in practice than state-made laws. There are trans-
national rules such as international treaties, codes of conduct made by 
transnational corporations, and a small but growing number of collective 
agreements with interncHional trade unions and non-governmental organ-
isations. There are also the rules of regional institutions, such as SADe. 
15 Dworkin Sovereign virtue.- The theory and praC[1ce of equallry (Hal·varli University Press, 
(arnuridge Massacilusetts. ~OOO) a[ J 79-·80, J 8 J. 3 
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The pluralist perspective sees regulatory diversity not so much as a 
competition between state systems of labour law, but as a strategic Of 
political process between different legal orders both within and beyond 
the state. Katherine Stone argues that globalisation 'not only breeds a 
desire for localisation, it also breeds the means to achieve it'. It> She points 
[Q the agglomeration of transnational corporations in particular places, 
such as the computer industry in Silicon Valley, partly because of the skills 
and knowledge of the locality's workforce and the networks they can 
establish. The attractions of such regions dissuade corporations from 
moving off~shore to avoid high labour costS, increases the leverage of local 
work and community groups, and (he opportunities for local investment 
in human capital. If the centralised state is not able to provide the redis-
tributive functions of labour laws, then struggles for social protection will 
become increasingly localised. But local unions and community groups 
will be powerless to act together to put pressure on transnational corpora-
tions to adopt best practices - the 'race to the top' - unless they have 
rights. Rights which reduce divisions between different employment 
statuses at local level (employees, contingent or atypical, and self-em-
ployed), and between working-life and family-life can strengthen these 
local solidarities. Rights - such as those to establish bargaining councils 
and workplace forums - can help to develop solidarities with those em-
ployed by the same transnational corporation in other countries. 
There is, of course, an ever-present danger (hat (he rhetoric of rights-
talk can become far removed from the reality of the practice of liberalis-
ation. Even universal social and labour rights are not unqualified. Rights to 
decem working condiLions and LO fair pay depend upon the level of socio-
economic development in a particular country and they generally presup-
pose economic growth and expanding social welfare. Rights in the market 
place are balanced against economic considerations. For example, the 
right against indirect discrimination on grounds of sex or race is subject to 
justification on grounds of business necessity or cost. So, a German law 
that excluded from unfair dismissal prorection, employees in undertakings 
with five or fewer employees had a significant adverse impact on women 
who are disproportionately employed in small enterprises. But the law 
was held to be justified by the European Court of Justice (ECJ). This was 
because it pursued the legitimate aim of creating jobs In small undertak-
ings, and the measure was proportional to that aim. II There is also the 
problem of effective enforcement. The argument that only civil rights can 
be justiciable is now widely discredited, but the courts - led by the South 
African Constitutional Court and the Indian Supreme Coun - are only 
gradually developing effective procedures and mechanisms for enforcing 
so-called social rights. More generally, increasing reliance on 'soft law' 
(such as voluntary corporate codes and guidelines laid down by regional 
and international bodies), the tendency wwards privatisation of enforce-
ment through management-controlled disputes resolution procedures rather 
16 Stone 'From globalism to regionClIism: Prolecting lallor rigtlts in a Pos[-National Era' 
(lJn(Jublistled paper, 20(4). I am grateful for the author's perrnission LO cile [his paper. 
17 Kirshwnmrr-Hark vSida/ [1994] IRLR 185 (ECj). 
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than public tribunals, and restrictions on collective solidarity, reduce much 
rights talk to mere rhetoric - in Jeremy Bentham's famous phrase ·50 
much bawling on paper' .'H 
I come then to the question whether labour rights can be reconciled 
with global competitiveness? My answer is a qualified 'Yes', The alterna-
tive would simply be to leave things to global market forces in the belief 
that the 'invisible hand' will in the long run result in equilibrium. This is an 
argument for widespread deregulation which, I believe, would be una~ 
cceplable in pos[~apartheid South Africa. The theory of comparative insti-
tutional advantage encourages us to use rights in a rational way. Rights 
can help markets work more effectively by correcting market failures and 
promoting economic efficiency; they can reduce (he inequality of the em-
ployment relationship; and they can be used to exert democratic control 
over the processes and outcomes of globalisation, 
Comparative advantage should never involve the violation of core hu-
man rights This is why the ILO's campaign for 'decent work', including 
the observance of Fundamental rights, is of critical importance not only LO 
the developing countries but also to workers in the rich nations. The ILO's 
Oeclaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, adopted in 
1998, places obligations on all 175 Member States of the ILO to 'respect, 
to promote and to realise' Four fundamental principles: the freedom of 
association and right to collective bargaining, the elimination of forced 
labour; the elimination of child labour and the elimina(ion of all forms of 
discrimination. These principles are embodied in eight 'core' ILO conven-
tions. The unique feature of the Declaration is (hat it imposes obligations 
on the Member States, not by reason of the ratification of these conven-
tions, but 'from the very fact of membership', This is, therefore, a consti-
tutional obligation. An interesling question is whether any of the funda-
mental principles and rights embodied in the Declaration have become 
part of customary international law. The International Court of Justice has 
said that the practice of states, followed from a sense of legal obligation, 
must be 'broadly consistent'. I~ While the prohibition of forced labour is a 
matter on which state practice is broadly consistent, it is much more diffi-
cult to show this in respect of the prohibition on child labour, The UK 
House of Lords has recently recognised that racial discrimination is a 
breach of customary international law 2f:. but the situation is less clear with 
other forms of arbitrary discrimination. Widespread abuse of freedom of 
associarion in many countries make i[ virtually impossible to regard these 
human rights as part of consistent state practice, but the growing observ-
ance of the relevant conventions may in rime change this. 
I H Henltia!Tl 'ArlMchical fallacies' in Bowring td CoJ/!;'cted works ~f Jeremy Bentham (Simp-
kin Marshall, Lundon, 1843) 23: see generally on Ihe law amj polilics uf enforcement, 
Hepple in Sucwl and Labour Rights in (l (j/obal Con{fx{ (Cambridge UniversilY Press, 
Ccunbridgc, 2002) ch 10 
19 Nicaru.yua v Unlled Still!;';, II 9~61 leJ 11 al 48, 76 II.R 319 ar 432 
20 R v /mmigTfltion C?Uir:f'r al pTfl!Jw: Airport. ex pane Europe(/n Roma Rights Centre f2005] 
lRl.I\ pars 46 (Lord Sleyn) 102. I U3 (Baroness Hale). Sec, generally Shaw International 
Law 5 eel (CUi>, Carnbridge. 2(03) 28-29. 
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Although the Declaration may not have elevated all these fundamental 
principles to [he level of customary international Jaw, and it can be criti-
cised for its weak follow-up mechanism and its dilution of the 'rights' in 
the eight conventions into four general principles, it has led to a signifi-
cant increase in the number of ratifications of the eight core conventions. 
By 2004, a total of 100 Member States (including South Africa) had rat-
ified all eight core conventions and 144 countries had ratified at least one 
convention in each group. 'There is a long hard road to travel' before 
international labour standards can take human labour out of global com-
petition. 21 BU[ the idea of fundamental rights is a dynamic one (hac will be 
progressively developed and updated, for example to include occupational 
health and safety. A more effeC[ive complaints-based mechanism for 
supervising compliance with these rights is needed. Membership of the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) could be made conditional upon the 
observance of core labour rights, but the supervision and enforcement of 
these standards should be left to the ILO and not the WTO." 
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